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Preferred Provider Organization Structures
and Agreements
James C. Dechene*
INTRODUCrION
Despite the failure of the last Congress to enact any compre-
hensive health reform plan, and doubts about whether the new
Republican-led Congress will focus on health care reform, the
market is rapidly changing the face of our health care delivery
system. Third-party payers are competing to form networks of
providers that can provide cost-effective, quality medical serv-
ices. Physicians and other providers are forming their own net-
works that can be offered to third-party payers.
The networks fill a void in the delivery system that developed
after decades of indemnity insurance coverage for health care
services. That void is the absence of mechanisms to ensure that
the care provided by the delivery system is cost-effective and of
a reasonable quality. In the basic indemnity model delivery sys-
tem, patients had little incentive to utilize only cost-effective
providers. Similarly, indemnity payers historically did not focus
on the need for cost-effective care. Indeed, there was little that
indemnity payers could do if patients chose less cost-effective
providers.
The foregoing gaps in indemnity coverage led to the forma-
tion of various preferred provider organizations (PPOs). The
basic feature of these organizations is a limited panel of provid-
ers selected in some manner that will control costs. Most early
panels were selected simply on the basis of the providers' will-
ingness to grant discounts. Providers willing to discount from
their usual and customary fees were included in the network,
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while those who were not willing to discount were not included
in the network.
Mere discounts from usual and customary charges, however,
provide only a one-time savings. Indeed, in many cases, provid-
ers raised their usual prices by the amount of the discount, mak-
ing any reduction illusory. Moreover, price discounts can be
quickly eliminated through excess utilization. Thus, third-party
payers discovered that real savings could be achieved only
through selecting a network of cost-effective providers.
Unfortunately, limited networks created by payers pose a sig-
nificant threat to providers. Providers may never be selected to
participate in networks established by third-party payers. The
costs for other payers of putting together their own network of
providers may be prohibitive. Thus, the only way that many
providers may have the opportunity to participate in a preferred
provider network is to form their own PPO that then is offered
to payers.
In large part, formation of provider networks is motivated by
the fear that the networks created by third-party payers will not
include many providers. Providers may find that their long-term
viability is enhanced only if they form their own networks. In
addition, many providers believe that the only way to control
the selection process, credentialing process, and other aspects of
the PPO is to form, own, and operate the PPO themselves.
This article addresses the two leading issues that providers
need to consider in considering PPO options. First, what struc-
ture should be used to form a PPO that can be offered to pay-
ers? Second, what are the major issues that arise in the
contracts between the PPO and payer, and between the PPO
and individual participating providers.
I. LEGAL STRUCTURE
There are six structures that are generally considered when
forming a PPO. These are: (1) contractual arrangements be-
tween payers and providers; (2) a general partnership; (3) a lim-
ited partnership; (4) a limited liability company; (5) a taxable,
for-profit corporation; and (6) a tax-exempt, not-for-profit cor-
poration. While these structures are quite diverse, one of these
structures should meet the needs of the particular group seeking
to form a PPO.
The selection of the best legal structure generally involves
considerations relating to (1) governance; (2) ownership; (3)
[Vol. 4
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control; (4) limitation of liability; and (5) tax issues. Of course,
the structure selected will not ipso facto create a successful PPO.
The structure merely provides the vehicle for establishing the
provider network. The effectiveness of any vehicle depends on
the commitment of both the PPO sponsors and the providers to
work together to reduce costs without reducing quality. The fol-
lowing issues and considerations relate to each of the possible
PPO structures.
A. Contractual Arrangements
Payers and managed care plans typically create their PPO net-
works solely through provider contracts. Of course, provider
contracts are an important feature of all PPOs. In the case of
payer PPO networks, the provider contracts essentially are all
that is necessary to form the PPO. A PPO created solely by a
payer is relatively simple to establish and easier to terminate
than the other alternatives. Contractual arrangements eliminate
the need to create a formal business entity. The contracting par-
ties generally are independent of each other, so there is less like-
lihood of imputed liability for the actions of the other
participating parties.
Providers seeking to form a PPO can attempt to do so solely
on the basis of contracts. However, provider-sponsored PPOs
that rely solely on contractual arrangements are limited in what
they can accomplish since no single entity can hold itself out to
payers as the platform for the PPO. Many issues arise.
Initially, by not creating a single, integrated entity, provider
PPOs face a number of antitrust concerns. Pricing issues be-
come especially sensitive in contractual joint ventures. Partici-
pants remain independent economic agents. As such, they
generally must determine prices independently. There may be
limited exceptions, however, permitting agreement on the global
price that will be charged for a joint service provided under the
contract.
In addition, the formation and operation of a PPO generally is
subject to state law regulation. These laws discourage providers
from forming a PPO solely on a contractual basis. For example,
many states now expressly regulate third-party administrators
(TPAs). In many cases, TPAs are defined as persons or entities
that administer insurance benefits for others.' Of course, many
1. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 1759 (Deering 1995).
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PPOs may not meet the definition of a TPA under state law,
particularly where the PPO limits itself to making available a
network and conducting various utilization and peer review ac-
tivities. To the extent, however, that a PPO is involved in
processing and paying claims, the PPO is likely to be covered by
the TPA statute.
In most cases, TPA regulations require the administrator to
obtain a license, post a fidelity bond, and use licensed individu-
als to process and pay claims. In some cases, state law may also
limit the methods by which a TPA is compensated. For exam-
ple, under California law, a TPA may not be compensated on
the basis of claims experience. 2 The view is that claims experi-
ence compensation is analogous to assuming some of the risk of
the plan-an insurance function.
Other states directly regulate the administrators of PPOs. For
example, the Illinois Health Care Reimbursement Reform Act
of 1985 requires that all PPO administrators register with the
Department of Insurance. A PPO administrator is defined as
any person or entity "that arranges, contracts with, or adminis-
ters contracts with a provider whereby beneficiaries are pro-
vided an incentive to use the services of such provider. '' 4 Each
administrator who handles money must establish a fiduciary ac-
count and post a fidelity bond.-
As a result of the foregoing laws, the person or entity desiring
to form the PPO will generally need to register the PPO with
the state insurance department. Thus, the application of these
laws often makes it more desirable to operate the PPO from a
platform that includes a separate legal structure. The exception
is the PPO that is operated by a payer, for example, a PPO
formed by a self-insured plan under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which is generally not
subject to state insurance law. In some cases, the ERISA plan
may then offer the PPO to other ERISA plans or payers, which
typically subjects the offering plan to state regulation. However,
the plan already offering the PPO may not find it necessary or
desirable to form a separate legal entity to house the PPO
function.
2. See id. § 1759.8.
3. 215 ILCS 5/370k (Smith-Hurd 1994).
4. Id. at 5/370g(g) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994).
5. Id. at 5/3701 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
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For persons seeking to create a PPO through contractual ar-
rangements, the contractual vehicle of choice is a single provider
agreement. That agreement generally needs to include all of the
terms that payers desire to include in their contracts with prov-
iders. Indeed, the central function of the PPO is to facilitate the
contractual process under which providers become contractually
bound to payers to deliver services in the cost-effective way de-
sired by the payers.
In particular, a typical PPO/provider contract will need to in-
clude appropriate terms covering the following areas:
1. appointment of the PPO representative as attorney in
fact for purposes of entering into PPO and/or health
maintenance organization (HMO) contracts;
2. establishment of PPO pricing and payment, which terms
could be on the basis of a fee schedule, a fixed discount
from usual and customary charges, or a type of capita-
tion or all-inclusive rate;
3. provision of medical services in accordance with usual
standards in the area and in the specific PPO networks in
which the provider participates;
4. agreement to refer to and utilize in-network providers
where possible;
5. agreement to follow the treatment protocols of the PPO,
including, where applicable, the use of drug formularies
and other such requirements;
6. agreement to cooperate with the peer review and
credentialing processes of the PPO;
7. agreement to comply with patient billing limitations of
the PPO;
8. agreement to verify the PPO coverage of patients;
9. agreement to obtain pre-service authorization where
appropriate;
10. agreement to cooperate in the utilization review and
quality assessment processes of the PPO;
11. agreement to release medical records for the administra-
tion of the PPO;
12. participation in the outcome and performance data sys-
tem of the PPO, including the use of provider "report
cards" reflecting the utilization and cost effectiveness of
providers;
1995]
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13. agreement to maintain appropriate levels of professional
liability insurance coverage;
14. possible indemnification of the PPO for claims made
against it that relate to the services furnished by the
provider;
15. provider representations and warranties relating to such
issues as licensure, privileges, and accuracy of applica-
tion information; and
16. length of term and termination provisions.
Specific contracts may also contain other terms particular to
the PPO. These may include noncompete clauses, network or
provider exclusivity provisions, prohibitions on waivers of
copayments and deductibles, or requirements for the payer to
enforce its patient steerage provisions.
In sum, the use of provider contracts is the typical way by
which payers create their PPO networks. On the other hand,
contractual arrangements for provider-sponsored PPOs are gen-
erally viewed as temporary, interim approaches. They are useful
where speed in establishing a relationship is imperative. They
should also be considered where the parties want to consider a
trial arrangement before they commit to a more permanent
venture.
A provider-sponsored PPO that is limited to contractual ar-
rangements is more difficult to operate. There is no central
management with the authority to bind participating parties,
and decisions relating to proposals for third-party payers require
separate decisions by each participant. Upon termination of the
PPO for whatever reason, the participants may individually seek
to appropriate the goodwill and existing business relations of the
venture for themselves. These issues require careful
consideration.
B. General Partnership
As discussed above, it will generally make the most sense to
form a legal structure to own and operate a PPO. One legal
structure to consider is the general partnership, as it is usually
the easiest and least expensive multiple-owner legal structure
that can be established.
When establishing a general partnership, there is no need to
secure a corporate charter or comply with the necessary formali-
ties associated with a corporation. Generally, there are no regu-
latory filings or fees associated with the formation and operation
[Vol. 4
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of a partnership. In addition, there is no separate tax incurred
at the organizational level-all of the profits and losses of the
partnership are attributed to the individual partners. This
avoids the double taxation of distributed earnings associated
with most corporations.
There are, however, some significant disadvantages associated
with a general partnership. Initially, all of the partners have un-
limited liability for any claims that may be brought against the
partnership. Thus, the personal assets of individual partners are
potentially exposed for the partnership's creditors or claimants.
To some extent, the risk to individual partners can be managed
through liability insurance and a strong financial base within the
partnership. Nevertheless, there is greater potential exposure to
a partner in a general partnership than for an investor in a lim-
ited partnership, corporation, or limited liability company.
Moreover, the profits and losses of the partnership are attrib-
uted to the partners whether or not any income is in fact distrib-
uted to the partners. Thus, a partner may incur a significant tax
liability for partnership income without receiving any cash flow
from the partnership. To the extent that the partnership re-
quires additional capital to operate, the partners may be called
upon to make mandatory capital contributions to the
partnership.
As a result of these disadvantages, the general partnership
form is rarely used for the formation and operation of a PPO.
The only circumstances where the general partnership might be
a viable alternative are (1) where the PPO will be owned and
operated by existing corporate organizations, such as a joint
venture among several self-insured ERISA plans; (2) where two
or more relatively small insurers desire to pool their resources
for the formation and operation of a PPO network that could be
used by all of the partners; or (3) where the PPO will be oper-
ated by corporate providers such as hospitals, existing physician
organizations, or physician-hospital organizations that desire to
form a broader network of providers. The partners will be enti-
ties that already have limited liability through their existing cor-
porate structures. For those existing entities, tax efficiency and
the avoidance of yet another layer of tax make the general part-
nership form particularly attractive. The partnership form per-
mits the partners to share the costs associated with the
development of the PPO, share access to the network created,
19951
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and share revenues that may result from renting the network to
other payers.
General partnerships, of course, are governed by state part-
nership statutes and the terms of the general partnership agree-
ment. Virtually all states have adopted the Model Uniform
Partnership Act,6 with minor variations. However, the general
partnership agreement can modify most of the fall-back posi-
tions that are provided for in the state statutes. While there is
no legal requirement that the partnership be formed by a writ-
ten agreement, it is, of course, advisable to ensure that all un-
derstandings are memorialized in a written agreement.
The partnership agreement generally specifies how the part-
ners shall make business decisions regarding the enterprise, cap-
ital contributions, and divisions of profits and losses. There may
be special provisions regarding extraordinary decisions,
noncompete provisions, and procedures for termination of the
partnership. The partnership agreement can be revised or
amended at any time through the agreement of the partners.
C. Limited Partnership
The limited partnership form is frequently considered for
either (1) the creation of a PPO by a group of providers, or (2)
the creation of a PPO by one or more payers where there are
significant concerns relating to limiting liability. This structure
for a PPO has two principal advantages: (1) the liability of each
of the limited partners is limited to their capital contributions,
and (2) the income of the partnership is taxed once as the in-
come of the partners. However, as discussed at section I(D), the
comparatively new option of the limited liability company
(LLC) has reduced the usefulness of the limited partnership
option.
A limited partnership is established in much the same way as
a general partnership. Each state has a limited partnership stat-
ute that generally is patterned on the Model Limited Partner-
ship Act. 7 The fall-back provisions contained in the statutes can
generally be modified by the terms of a written limited partner-
ship agreement. In order to satisfy Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) requirements for partnership taxation, the document must
provide for the allocation of losses to limited partners in a man-
ner that reduces the capital accounts of the limited partners. In
6. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Acr (1993).
7. See UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP Acr (1985).
[Vol. 4
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some cases, this means that the capital accounts of the limited
partners may become negative. The limited partners are not re-
quired to make up the deficiencies in their capital accounts.
However, any subsequent earnings of the limited partnership
will need to be credited against accumulated deficits before
there is any distribution of subsequent profits.
In many cases, the general partner is designated as a corpo-
rate entity. This has the effect of limiting the total exposure of
the limited partnership to the assets of the limited partnership
plus the assets of the corporation that serves as the general part-
ner. Of course, the corporate general partner must have suffi-
cient assets of its own. Otherwise, the IRS may tax the
enterprise as a corporation, and creditors and claimants may
successfully pierce the corporate veil.
The limited partnership form does not eliminate the tax liabil-
ity of partners' undistributed profits. If the partnership retains
profits to build up the business, individual partners will still have
to include their portion of the profits in their income. In some
cases, the limited partnership agreement requires the partner-
ship to distribute to the partners a sufficient portion of the prof-
its (for example, 35%) so that partners will at least have
sufficient cash flow to cover their tax liability.
D. Limited Liability Company
The limited liability company (LLC) is a relatively attractive
option for the formation of a PPO by a group of providers. It
can be used both for the formation of a physician-sponsored
PPO or for the formation of a physician-hoSpital organization
(PHO). The LLC can provide useful solutions to governance
issues through the flexibility permitted in its organizational doc-
uments. At the same time, it provides the limited liability that
providers usually insist upon when forming a PPO.
A comparatively new structure, the LLC is an unincorporated
organization whose owners' liability is limited to their invest-
ment in the organization.8 The form has been expressly adopted
by statute in most states.9
8. See Robert Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company: A Study of the
Emerging Entity, 47 Bus. LAW. 375, 378-381 (1992).
9. LLC statutes have been adopted by the following states: ALA. CODE §§ 10-12-1
to -61 (Supp. 1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-601 to -857 (Supp. 1994); ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 4-32-101 to -1316 (Michie Supp. 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-80-101
to -1101 (1994); 1993 Conn. Acts 93-267 (Reg. Sess.), amended by 1994 Conn. Acts
94-217 (Reg. Sess.); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101 to -1107 (Supp. 1994); FLA.
1995]
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In essence, LLCs combine the tax treatment of partnerships
with the limited liability characteristics of corporations.10 Un-
like the limited partnership, there is no need for a general part-
ner who has unlimited liability exposure since each of the
participants in an LLC enjoy limited liability. Thus, unlike the
limited partnership, each of the participants can actively engage
in the management and operation of the enterprise.
LLCs may also be an option for parties seeking partnership
tax treatment where there are numerous investors. This can be
the case with PPOs that are owned by the providers that partici-
pate in the network. While Subchapter S11 status is only avail-
able for corporations with 35 or fewer individual investors,
LLCs can be formed with an unlimited number of investors.
LLCs must be established and operated in strict compliance
with the requirements in the applicable state's authorizing stat-
ute. Participants in an LLC cannot freely transfer their interests
in the same manner as shareholders or holders of limited part-
nership interests. Instead, to terminate an interest in the LLC,
participants must withdraw from the LLC, receiving fair value
from the LLC for their interest.
As a comparatively new form of enterprise, there are still a
number of important questions regarding LLCs, depending on
STAT. ch. 608.401-.471 (1993); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-11-100 to -1109 (1994); IDAHO
CODE §§ 53-601 to -672 (1994); 805 ILCS 180/1-1 to 180/60-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1994); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-18-1-1 to -13-1 (Bums 1994); IOWA CODE §§ 490A.100-
.1601 (Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7601 to -7657 (Supp. 1994); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 275.001-.455 (Baldwin Supp. 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1301-
:1369 (West 1994); 1993 ME. LAWS 718; MD. CODE Ar. CORPS. & Ass'NS §§ 4A-101
to -1103 (1993 Repl. vol.); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 450-4101 to -5200 (Supp. 1994);
MINN. STAT. §§ 322B.01-.960 (Supp. 1995); 1994 Miss. Laws 402; Mo. REV. STAT.
§§ 347.010-.740 (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-8-101 to -1102 (Supp. 1994); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 21-2601 to -2653 (Cumin. Supp. 1994); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 86.010-.571 (Michie 1994 Repl. vol.); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304-c:1 to -c:85
(Cumin. Supp. 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:2B-1 to :2B-70 (Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 53-19-1 to -74 (Michie 1993 Repl. Pamplet); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 57C-1-01 to
-10-03 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-32-01 to -155 (Cumin. Supp. 1993); 1994 Ohio
Laws 103 (S.B. 74); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, §§ 2000-2060 (Supp. 1995); OR. REV. STAT.
1§ 63.001-.990 (Cumin. Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-16-1 to -75 (1992); 1994 S.C.
Acts 448; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 47-34-1 to -59 (Supp. 1994); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 48-248-101 to -606 (Supp. 1994); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n
(West Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE Am. §§ 48-2b-102 to -157 (1994 Repl. Vol.); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1000 to -1073 (Michie 1993 Repl. Vol.); 1994 Wash. Legis. Serv.
211 (West); W. VA. CODE §§ 31-lA-1 to -69 (Supp. 1994); WIs. STAT. §§ 183.0102-
.1305 (Supp. 1994); Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-15-101 to -136 (1989).
10. In particular, each participant is taxed on the participant's share of income
without regard to whether there has been a distribution of income.
11. 26 U.S.C. § 1361(b) (1988).
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the state. These include: (1) whether the LLC can be used for
professional service organizations, and (2) the extent to which
units in an LLC PPO offered only to providers actively involved
in the governance and operation of the PPO are securities sub-
ject to registration under state or federal law. However, in a
state that recognizes the LLC form, the LLC may be a viable
option for the formation of a PPO as an alternative to a limited
partnership.
E. Taxable, For-Profit Corporation
The form that satisfies the objectives of most sponsors of
PPOs is the taxable, for-profit corporation. In addition to limit-
ing the liability of the owners, it can provide creative solutions
to governance issues through the use of multiple classes of stock.
The corporate form is, of course, subject to double taxation of
any income that is distributed to its owners. However, the taxa-
tion issue is of lesser concern for provider-sponsored PPOs. The
provider sponsors of the PPO are generally more interested in
securing the additional patient volume that results from partici-
pation in managed care arrangements than in earning profits
from the operation of the PPO network.
The principal advantage of the taxable, for-profit corporation
is that it limits the liability of all investors to their initial invest-
ment. It is frequently viewed as an entity separate and distinct
from its owners, unlike other business entities. Owners of a for-
profit, corporate PPO may also have the opportunity to share in
the appreciation in value that could accompany the creation of a
successful PPO network. Although there are necessary formali-
ties that must be followed in order to establish and operate a
taxable, for-profit corporation, those formalities are not diffi-
cult. In particular, the charter or articles of incorporation must
be filed with the secretary of state or other state agencies. The
corporation must also pay applicable franchise taxes and must
follow corporate governance requirements to ensure that the ac-
tivities of the corporation are valid.
Unlike tax-exempt, not-for-profit enterprises, a for-profit cor-
poration is not subject to regulatory oversight by the attorney
general to ensure that the not-for-profit purposes are being ful-
filled.' 2 Thus, it is much easier to sell, transfer, liquidate, or
restructure a for-profit corporation. In the event of a sale, the
12. Not-for-profit corporations are generally monitored by the attorney general to
ensure that the organization is fulfilling its purposes for the public trust.
1995]
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shareholders of a for-profit corporation can share in the appreci-
ation in the entity. Similarly, if the structure is not established
to be a tax-exempt entity, there is no need to seek the approval
of the IRS, 13 and less scrutiny is placed on arrangements be-
tween the organization and its shareholders, officers, and
directors.
The principal disadvantage of the for-profit, taxable corpora-
tion is double taxation. Profits of the enterprise are taxed once
at the corporate level, and again after they are distributed to
shareholders. Unlike a partnership, however, shareholders are
not taxed on undistributed profits of the corporation.
It is important to note that use of the for-profit, taxable struc-
ture does not necessarily mean that the management of the or-
ganization has to focus on profitability. A for-profit entity can
seek to operate with near-zero profits over the long run. Fol-
lowing that strategy, a for-profit corporation can achieve many
of the advantages of a tax-exempt entity without the regulatory
scrutiny.
F. Not-For-Profit, Tax-Exempt Corporation
The not-for-profit corporate structure for PPOs generally is
limited to PPOs that are sponsored in part by not-for-profit hos-
pital systems. Not-for-profit hospital systems frequently are
more comfortable using the not-for-profit corporate structure
for all of the systems' ventures. Also, the not-for-profit corpo-
rate structure is often used for PHOs involving not-for-profit
hospitals. There can be a number of advantages associated with
the use of a not-for-profit structure. These may include: (1) the
avoidance of securities registration requirements and other se-
curities regulatory issues; (2) creative solutions to governance
questions; (3) the reduction in concerns over the corporate prac-
tice of medicine in many states; and (4) the ability to generate a
tax deduction for the participants' contributions of capital to the
venture.
A not-for-profit, tax-exempt corporation combines two sepa-
rate features: the structure of a not-for-profit corporation under
13. Tax-exempt organizations must prove that the purposes, form, structure, and
intended operations of the organization meet the rules and regulations for tax-exempt
status as established by the IRS.
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state law with a tax-exempt status conferred by the IRS under
federal law. 14
A not-for-profit corporation does not issue shares of stock per
se. Indeed, the corporation is not owned by individuals.
Rather, the not-for-profit corporation is a corporate structure
that is impressed with a public trust.
State law governs the formation of the not-for-profit corpora-
tion. Generally, the organizers must file with the secretary of
state articles of incorporation, which set forth the not-for-profit
purposes of the organization as well as the manner of choosing
the board of trustees/directors, the governing body of the organ-
ization. This governance structure, a key feature of the not-for-
profit corporation, provides a great deal of flexibility. A not-
for-profit corporation may be established with one or more cor-
porate "members" who elect some or all of the members of the
board. The corporate members' rights are limited to governing
the organization as they have no claim to any of the assets, earn-
ings, or underlying business value of the enterprise. Other not-
for-profit corporations have a self-perpetuating board, the mem-
bers of which are elected by existing board members.
Both the initial capital and all of the earnings of the not-for-
profit corporation must be used to support the charitable pur-
poses of the organization. Capital is raised from contributions
(rather than the sale of shares), loans, and operating profits. If
the operations of the not-for-profit become very profitable and
an outside investor wishes to purchase the assets, the proceeds
of the sale become impressed with a public trust. The not-for-
profit cannot pay dividends to initial investors or otherwise con-
vert the proceeds of the not-for-profit to private uses.
The mere fact that a corporation is not-for-profit does not
guarantee that the corporation will also be exempt from tax. To
qualify for tax-exempt status, the organization must be formed
14. It is important to note that the requirements for achieving tax-exempt status
under federal tax laws are different from the requirements for creating a not-for-
profit corporation under state law. For example, the IRS has indicated that it will not
grant tax-exempt status to an integrated delivery system in which physicians have
more than 20% of the governance of the organization. EXEMPT ORGS. TECHNICAL
Div., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFES-
SIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM 212, 227-28 (1993). Be-
cause the foregoing IRS position is recent, it is not clear the extent to which states
may impose a similar requirement to obtain an exemption from state taxes. States
that look to the IRS' position for guidance are likely to impose a similar requirement.
For most purposes, of course, federal tax-exempt status is a much greater concern
than state tax-exempt status.
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and operated principally for one or more of the charitable pur-
poses that are recognized under section 501(c)(3) 15 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code. Any income earned from activities that are
unrelated to the tax-exempt purposes of the organization will be
taxed as unrelated business income. The organization must be
operated in a manner that ensures that its income and assets do
not inure to the benefit of private parties.
To secure tax-exempt status, the corporation must file an ap-
plication with the IRS and demonstrate that it meets one of the
qualifications for exemption set forth in section 501. If the cor-
poration also desires to be exempt from state taxation, it must
file an appropriate application with the state department of rev-
enue. It is possible for not-for-profit corporations to be (1) tax-
able under both state and federal law; (2) taxable under federal
law, but exempt from tax under state law; or (3) exempt from
tax under federal law, but taxable under state law.
There are some significant advantages associated with utiliz-
ing a tax-exempt, not-for-profit entity. Initially, of course, any
earnings of the organization in fulfillment of its charitable pur-
poses will not be subject to taxation. This includes earnings that
may be necessary to pay back loans used to help capitalize the
initial operation. In addition, the organization can raise capital
through tax-deductible contributions. The formation of the or-
ganization does not usually implicate either federal or state se-
curities laws. The structure also provides considerable flexibility
regarding the governance of the organization.
The disadvantages of the tax-exempt structure relate to the
regulatory requirements that the organization must continue to
satisfy. All arrangements involving a tax-exempt corporation
are subject to close scrutiny to ensure that they do not benefit
private individuals. In addition, if the activities of the organiza-
tion become profitable or there is a desire to sell the organiza-
tion, none of the value of the organization may be appropriated
by private individuals. Instead, all of the proceeds must be used
to continue supporting the charitable purposes for which the or-
ganization was initially formed.
In some circumstances it makes sense to utilize the not-for-
profit, taxable organization form for PPOs. This is especially
true in circumstances where the parties (1) seek to include a
large number of physicians as "investors"; (2) want to structure
15. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
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the transaction in a manner that does not require securities re-
gistration; and (3) desire a structure that provides the physician
participants with 50% of the board seats. Given the IRS' posi-
tion of refusing tax exemption when physicians constitute more
than 20% of the board, the use of the not-for-profit, taxable
structure can satisfy the objectives of the parties.
II. PPO CONTRACTING
The second important issue associated with PPO formation is
the structure and terms of the contracts that link the payers with
the providers of health care services. PPOs established by a spe-
cific payer and limited to that one payer only require the con-
tract between the payer and the providers. PPOs that serve
many payers bring together a network of providers, which gives
a payer "one-stop shopping" at the PPO. In the case of PPOs
that are separate and independent of payers, two contracts are
required: (1) the contract between the payers and the PPO, and
(2) the contract between the PPO and the individual providers.
The chain of contracts between payers and providers is the
heart of the PPO. The very reason for the development of PPOs
is to create a contractual linkage between the payers and the
providers of health care services. These contracts seek to cure
the fundamental flaw of traditional indemnity insurance: the ab-
sence of an agreement between the entities responsible for pay-
ment and the providers of services, with the goal of limiting
costs. The competitive advantage of PPOs is their ability to
make providers more cost sensitive and cost efficient in deliver-
ing health care. In most other segments of our economy, the
price sensitivity of consumers compels providers of goods and
services to be cost competitive and efficient. The fundamental
flaw of traditional health insurance has been its removal of eco-
nomic incentives from patients' consumption decisions. PPOs,
through their contracts with providers, re-create the incentives
to be cost effective in several ways. First, they obtain price dis-
counts from providers in return for the promise of more pa-
tients. Second, they select providers to participate in the PPO
on the basis of their quality and cost effectiveness. Third, they
require providers to follow established standards for the deliv-
ery of health care services. Providers unwilling to comply with
these requirements are not permitted to participate. These
objectives are achieved through the terms of the contracts link-
ing the payers to the providers through the PPO structure.
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In this section, the key features and issues under both the
PPO/participating payer agreement and the PPO/participating
provider agreement are analyzed. While PPOs that are estab-
lished by payers do not need a PPO/participating payer agree-
ment, most ultimately make their networks available to other
payers for a rental fee, the terms of which are set out in a PPO/
participating payer agreement.
A. PPO/Participating Payer Agreement
The PPO/participating payer agreement sets forth the terms
under which the PPO makes the network available to participat-
ing payers. This agreement generally sets forth the mechanism
by which the PPO will be paid for making the network available
to the payers. In many cases, payers will pay the PPO a percent-
age of total claims paid as an administration fee in exchange for
access to the network. In other cases, the fee will be calculated
on the basis of the total actual costs to the payer compared with
expected costs. Under these arrangements, the PPO is generally
given an incentive in the form of a larger fee if the PPO is able
to save the payer more than an agreed-upon amount. Some
payers may be given access to the network without paying a fee,
particularly if the PPO is formed by providers. In these cases,
the PPO's costs are covered by the fees paid by the participating
providers.
The payer agreement generally specifies the other functions
that the PPO will provide. These typically include network se-
lection, provider credentialing, utilization review, quality assess-
ment, collection of outcome and performance data, and
maintenance of practice standards and guidelines. Many PPOs
also engage in practice profiling to gauge which providers are
most cost effective. An important issue in this regard is whether
the practice profile data will be made available to the payers or
will only be used internally by the PPO. Since providers are
naturally sensitive about the use of practice profile data, most
would prefer that the data be used only by the PPO. On the
other hand, the practice profiles are very valuable for payers
that are determining which providers to include in the networks.
The issue of access to practice profile data is often controversial.
In addition, the payer agreement generally sets forth the
terms under which the participating providers will make their
services available to the payers. The ideal payer agreement is
carefully crafted to coordinate with all the individual provider
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participation agreements. In essence, a payer signs one agree-
ment with the PPO that provides the payer with access to the
PPO's network under the terms and conditions set forth in the
payer agreement, and the PPO enters into a large number of
participating provider agreements that cause the providers to be
bound to the terms required by the payer. In this way, providers
are spared the need to consider a variety of payer contract terms
while payers have one-stop shopping access to providers
through the PPO network.
The problem with this approach is that it requires the PPO to
have a solid knowledge of the specific form that payers will re-
quire in the terms that will bind the providers. If a payer does
not include the language that the payer desires for a crucial term
in the participating provider agreements, the PPO has a di-
lemma. The PPO can either refuse to offer the network to the
payer, or the PPO can attempt to amend all of the existing par-
ticipating provider agreements to include the language re-
quested by the payer. Over time, of course, the PPO should
learn the specific language that payers will require and ensure
that the participating provider agreements contain all crucial
terms. It is more difficult, of course, for the start-up PPO to
include all of the necessary provisions in its participating pro-
vider agreements.16
The payer agreement should also set forth the obligations of
the payer to both the PPO and the participating providers. Po-
tential obligations that should be contained in the payer agree-
ment include: (1) the incentives that the payer will provide to
encourage covered persons to utilize preferred providers; (2) the
mechanisms that the payer will use to verify enrollment and cov-
erage of individual members; (3) the system the payer will use
for promptly processing claims; (4) the payer's utilization review
functions; and (5) the payer's obligations to pay claims
promptly. If possible, it is useful to include language that pro-
tects providers who rely on a determination or communication
from the payer regarding coverage or eligibility for payment. It
is also useful to set forth a short period of time during which the
payer will pay all claims and during which the payer will give
16. In general, the participating provider agreement will have the terms described
above at section I(A). However, because each payer will have its own requirements
for each specific provision, it is at best speculation for the PPO to know which clauses
will satisfy the payers with which the PPO will contract.
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both the PPO and the providers the right to cancel the contract
if the payer does not pay the claims on a timely basis.
Another important issue in connection with the payer agree-
ment is whether the PPO is willing to be named as a fiduciary of
an ERISA plan. To the extent that the PPO will be performing
functions that are part of the administration of an ERISA health
plan, it is likely that the employer will ask the PPO to be a
named fiduciary for these functions, which may include deter-
mining coverage, credentialing providers, and making preadmis-
sion certification decisions.
From the employer's perspective, it is reasonable to name the
PPO as the fiduciary for the functions it performs. However,
many PPOs resist being a named fiduciary in an ERISA plan,
fearing that they will be subject to additional liability risk. It is
true that a fiduciary can be sued by plan participants who chal-
lenge the decision of the fiduciary. However, if the PPO is in
fact making decisions on behalf of the employer, it is likely to be
joined in any lawsuit challenging the decision regardless of
whether it is a named fiduciary of the plan. Moreover, the PPO
is likely to be asked to indemnify the plan for any liability that
may be incurred by the plan as a result of the PPO's actions.
While being a named fiduciary to an ERISA plan may not be
terribly onerous, a PPO that is a named fiduciary should be
given the discretion to make the delegated decisions without un-
due interference from the other plan fiduciary (typically the em-
ployer). ERISA requires that a fiduciary meet the standard of
care and diligence that a reasonable business person would em-
ploy in the conduct of that person's ordinary business affairs.17
The ERISA standard is not one of strict liability. Indeed, many
insurance companies construe the standard as excluding liability
for simple negligence.
Employers are naturally reluctant to retain a PPO to provide
services if the PPO is unwilling to be a named fiduciary. By
agreeing without undue hesitation to be a plan fiduciary, the
PPO greatly enhances its marketability. Of course, the PPO
must be diligent to ensure that the wording of the fiduciary lan-
guage is appropriately limited so as not to bind the PPO beyond
the functions that the PPO has taken on.
The PPO should also consider the language of the indemnifi-
cation clause. Most payers will require the PPO to indemnify it
17. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1988).
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for any losses that may be incurred as a result of the PPO's ac-
tivities. The language of the indemnification must be carefully
crafted with two points in mind. First, as discussed below in sec-
tion B(5), the liability insurance of the PPO may not cover obli-
gations created under an indemnity clause. The PPO must
check with its professional liability and errors and omissions car-
rier(s) prior to agreeing to any indemnification language.
Second, there should be reciprocal language included under
which the payer indemnifies the PPO for liability that may result
from the activities of the payer. For example, it is possible that a
PPO may be sued because a payer denied coverage for a partic-
ular treatment. The PPO should not be responsible for the costs
of defending such actions where the PPO was not involved in
the coverage decision. Similarly, plaintiffs suing ERISA plans
are likely to join the PPO with other involved parties. The risk
of litigation by an aggrieved covered person should be the re-
sponsibility of the ERISA plan unless the suit results from some
negligence or other failure of the PPO.
B. The PPO/Participating Provider Agreement
The key document establishing the relationship between the
PPO and the participating provider is the participating provider
agreement (PPA), which sets forth the obligations of each par-
ticipating provider. The PPA creates the network of providers
offered to the PPO's payers. Unfortunately, providers often
sign the PPA with little attention to the obligations that the
agreement imposes. In this section, some of the key features of
the PPA are addressed.
1. Provider Consent Mechanisms
The first key feature of the PPA is a mechanism for obtaining
provider consent to the specific terms that specific payers desire.
In essence, the PPA can be set up to obtain such consent in one
of two broad ways. The first alternative is for the PPO to de-
velop a mechanism whereby the specific terms required by each
payer are offered to participating providers each time they are
negotiated between the payer and the PPO. The second alterna-
tive is to include in one document all of the pricing, participa-
tion, and operating terms that the PPO anticipates will be
required by all of the payers with which the PPO contracts.
The first alternative is usually implemented through a variant
of the "messenger model," described in section B(3)(a). In par-
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ticular, each time the PPO negotiates a specific arrangement
with a payer, the PPO circulates the proposed terms to the par-
ticipating providers. The providers generally have a limited
amount of time (for example, 14 to 21 days) to opt in or opt out
of the arrangement. Usually, any provider that does not specifi-
cally opt out of the arrangement is bound to the proposed terms.
The messenger model poses obvious dilemmas for providers.
In particular, each provider must instruct the office manager of
the practice to be on the lookout for proposed PPO arrange-
ments. The provider must then review each offer within a very
short period of time. Failure to review and reject a contract of-
fer within the designated time can lead to some unintended con-
sequences. The messenger model operates much like a book-of-
the-month club, but with much greater consequences if the pro-
vider fails to return the selection of the month within the desig-
nated time. From the PPO's standpoint, this model is a waiting
game-it cannot be sure how many providers will opt out of the
arrangement and, therefore, how many providers it will be able
to make available to a specific payer until the opt-out period
passes.
Under the second alternative, the PPO tries to anticipate all
of the terms each payer will require, and then includes those
terms in a single PPA. The master PPA sets forth all of the spe-
cific terms that will apply for all of the payers. The success of
the PPO will depend on how well it can anticipate the needs of
payers in the marketplace. There will, of course, be times when
the PPO will need to revise or amend the PPA in order to meet
the changing needs of the market.
2. Pricing Terms
Another critical feature of the PPA is the pricing term, which
sets forth the prices that the payers will pay for specific services.
In most cases, the prices are set forth as an attachment or an
exhibit to the PPA.
The price terms could be as simple as a percentage discount
off the usual charges of the provider. In fact, most early PPOs
operated with such simple pricing terms. Of course, a straight
discount from a provider's usual and customary charges offers
limited opportunities for controlling costs since providers can
simply increase their charges to offset the percentage discount.
In addition, discounts from usual and customary charges are
somewhat harder to administer. Charges and costs are less pre-
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dictable for payers, since the charge in a particular case depends
on the actual provider used. Thus, the growing trend is to de-
velop fee schedules that bind all of the providers in the network.
Fee schedules are sometimes developed on the basis of the
Medicare Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) for inpatient serv-
ices and the Resource-Based Relative Value Scale (RBRVS) for
physicians' services. Often, the PPO simply develops a conver-
sion factor that will be used. In other cases, the PPO, through a
consultant, develops alternative comprehensive fee schedules
based on market needs. Under either approach, payers have a
greater certainty of the costs for specific courses of treatment
without regard to the provider selected to perform the service.
3. Pricing Mechanism
Wholly apart from the specific pricing terms is the mechanism
by which the PPO comes to an agreement with the providers
regarding prices. Indeed, the price determination process raises
sensitive antitrust issues. The leading case highlighting the anti-
trust risks of the price determination process is Arizona v. Mari-
copa County Medical Society. 8 In Maricopa, two county
medical societies established foundations that could be de-
scribed as early forms of PPOs. In an express desire to control
the costs of medical care, the physician participants agreed that
they would not charge patients or payers more than the maxi-
mum fees developed by the two foundations. The Court held
that the agreement constituted a per se violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act.19
The Court's holding is a source of great concern for all pro-
vider-sponsored PPOs. However, the crucial facts of Maricopa
are not likely to be duplicated in modern PPOs. First, the two
Maricopa foundations included the overwhelming majority of
physicians (approximately 70% and 80%, respectively) in the
area. Second, the foundations did very little other than offer a
cap on fees. They offered no credentialing, quality assurance,
risk bearing, or other services common to present-day PPOs. In
the absence of other procompetitive activities, a large number of
physicians agreeing to the maximum fees they will charge falls
within the area of traditional section 1 per se analysis.
On the other hand, a group of providers that accepts a capita-
tion contract with a payer, under which the participating provid-
18. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
19. Id. at 348.
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ers share the risk of overutilization, generally has broad
discretion in its negotiations with payers.20 Indeed, the individ-
ual participants in such a provider network generally have to be
able to agree among themselves on issues relating to the ade-
quacy of the capitation fee and the distribution of revenues.
Thus, the PPO providers accepting capitation can negotiate with
payers as a single entity.21
In contrast, an unintegrated PPO that does not accept the risk
attendant with capitation is more limited in the role it may take
in negotiations with payers. In such PPOs, the participating
providers may designate the PPO as their agent for purposes of
entering into managed care contracts within certain parameters.
The PPO should provide cost-control services and be involved in
20. See, e.g., Hassan v. Independent Practice Assocs., 698 F. Supp. 679, 689-691
(E.D. Mich. 1988) (the determination of a fee schedule by which an independent
practice association (IPA) distributed the proceeds from a capitated, risk-bearing
HMO contract neither violated the per se rule nor the rule of reason); Notice:
Southbank IPA Inc., et al. Proposed Consent Agreement With Analysis to Aid Public
Comment, 56 Fed. Reg. 50,912 (1991) ("[t]he proposed [consent] order would not
prohibit the physician respondents from: ... (2) entering into agreements with physi-
cians as participants in an integrated joint venture, as long as the physician partici-
pants are free to deal individually with any third-party payor"); 1993 Summary:
Department of Justice and FTC Antitrust Enforcement Policy Statements in the Health
Care Area, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,151 (Sept. 30, 1994); 1994 Summary: De-
partment of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Statements of Enforcement Policy
and Analytical Principles Relating to Health Care and Antitrust, 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 13,152 (Sept. 30, 1994).
21. Many providers express reservations about the ability of a provider-sponsored
PPO to ever determine pricing, citing the decision in Maricopa. However, in Mari-
copa, the foundations performed only three functions: (1) determination of maximum
fees that could be charged; (2) review of medical necessity and appropriateness of
treatment; and (3) claims processing. The physicians did not in any sense bear any
risk or establish any new entity or venture for the delivery of health care services. 457
U.S. at 339. Although the holding in Maricopa should be respected as a warning for
sham ventures, courts and antitrust enforcers have tended to limit the holding of Mar-
icopa to its facts. See, e.g., Hassan, 698 F. Supp. 679, 688 (differentiating Maricopa, as
Maricopa dealt with an agreement that affected competitor doctors' fees to an entire
community rather than the IPA plan in Hassan that only affected the maximum fees
the IPA'physicians could charge Health Plus members); Kartell v. Blue Shield of
Mass., 749 F.2d 922, 930 (1st Cir. 1984) (finding Maricopa not on point as it dealt with
agreements by competitors to fix prices, as opposed to a single firm setting prices),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1029 (1985); Konik v. Champlain Valley Physicians Hosp. Medi-
cal Ctr., 561 F. Supp. 700, 716-17 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that Maricopa did not
apply in situations dealing with professional corporations, as opposed to arrange-
ments between hundreds of competing physicians), aff'd, 733 F.2d 1007, cert. denied
469 U.S. 884 (1984); St. Bernard Gen. Hosp. v. Hospital Serv. Ass'n of New Orleans,
712 F.2d 978, 986 (5th Cir. 1983) (differentiating a vertical link from supplier to cus-
tomer, which burdens outsiders and not insiders, from the strict horizontal restraint
found in Maricopa), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 970 (1984).
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much more than just marketing activities in order to avoid anti-
trust challenges.
The best way for an unintegrated PPO to reduce the risk of an
antitrust attack on the price determination process is to develop
a structure that preserves the independence of each participat-
ing provider's pricing decisions. The prices of the PPO's provid-
ers should not be the result of agreements among participating
providers, the PPO should not permit participating providers to
collectively agree upon the prices or discounts that will be of-
fered by the PPO to managed care plans, and the providers
should not collectively approve a price list that has been pre-
pared by an outside consultant.
To develop an appropriate structure, antitrust attorneys gen-
erally recommend that unintegrated PPOs utilize one of three
principal models to arrive at the prices or discounts that their
participating providers will accept from payers: (1) the messen-
ger model; (2) the "black box" model; or (3) the power of attor-
ney model. These three models are not the only ways to
preserve the independence of pricing decisions. Moreover, they
do not guarantee that participating providers will not engage in
collective price determinations or use the PPOs' prices in evalu-
ating whether to participate in other managed care plans. How-
ever, they do provide a structure that can permit participating
providers to make independent pricing and participation
decisions.
a. The Messenger Model
The key aspect of the messenger model is that the entity wish-
ing to purchase health care, that is, the payer, effectively makes
the first offer regarding the payment terms. The PPO initially
provides the purchaser with a list of providers who are partici-
pating in the network. The purchaser then indicates the pro-
posed scope of the network and the type of pricing structure
that it desires. The pricing structure could be an overall fee
schedule, a percentage discount from customary charges, or any
other charge structure. The PPO, of course, can make sugges-
tions to the purchaser based on arrangements adopted in the
past.
Once the PPO receives the purchaser's "offer," the PPO com-
municates the offer to the participating providers. Typically, the
providers have a limited period of time (for example, 15 days) in
which to opt in or opt out of the proposed arrangement. A key
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consideration for the PPO in setting up the messenger model is
determining whether providers will be locked into a proposed
payment mechanism unless they submit a signed document opt-
ing out of the arrangement, or whether only those providers
who sign a written acceptance will be part of the arrangement.
The latter provides maximum flexibility for providers, but is
inefficient and makes the composition and extent of the PPO's
provider network uncertain. If the initial offer is not accepted
by enough providers, the purchaser may need to change its offer
and the process must be repeated. Due to the cumbersome,
inefficient nature of the process, the messenger model has not
been particularly attractive.
b. The "Black Box" Model
The PPO that uses the "black box" model retains an in-
dependent consultant to develop and recommend a competitive
fee structure for the PPO. The consultant looks to existing pre-
vailing charges and develops a structure that will be competitive.
In developing this charge structure, the consultant does not con-
sider the preferences of any individual participants in the PPO.
Thus, the determination of the fee structure accomplished
through the "black box" approach is completely insulated from
the providers.
It is important to appreciate that the "black box" approach
need not be limited to a single price for each service. In many
cases, the consultant develops three prices for each service. The
best (lowest) price is reserved for payers that commit to steering
a substantial number of patients to the PPO. The highest price
is for payers offering minimal steerage of patients or a small pa-
tient base. The intermediate price is for payers with an interme-
diate amount of steerage and/or patients.
After the fee structure has been developed, the PPO presents
it to the physicians and other providers who have expressed in-
terest in participating in the network. Each physician or pro-
vider decides on an independent basis whether or not to
participate in the network at the level of reimbursement recom-
mended by the consultant. Providers must be alerted that the
"black box" fee schedule is only for the use of the network and
should not be considered or used for any individual pricing deci-
sion of the providers.
After each provider has independently agreed to the pricing
and other terms of managed care arrangements set forth in the
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PPA, the PPO markets the network to payers. Under this
model, both the PPO and the payers know the terms and extent
of the network as of the time of the initial negotiations. The
"black box" thus helps facilitate negotiations with payers and
makes the process both more efficient and less time consuming.
c. The Power of Attorney Model
The power of attorney structure allows participating providers
to transfer to the PPO their power of attorney to enter into any
managed care arrangement that meets certain standards. For
example, each provider can submit to the PPO a price list sched-
ule representing the lowest managed care pricing arrangement
that the provider will accept. The PPO then has the discretion
to enter into managed care arrangements with purchasers con-
sistent with the constraints designated by each provider. Once
the PPO enters into an arrangement, the participating providers
are bound, with no opportunity to opt in or opt out of the ar-
rangement. For greater flexibility, providers can offer a menu of
prices based on the volume of patients controlled and/or steered
to the provider by the payer.
This approach couples a greater level of provider control
(similar to the messenger model) with greater certainty (similar
to that possible under the black box model). However, the ar-
rangement is somewhat more cumbersome than the black box
approach since there can be a wide range of prices for a given
service among the participating providers. The PPO and the
purchasers have to determine whether to fix a price schedule
that is above the floor designated by the participating providers
or to accept multiple levels of reimbursement for the participat-
ing providers.
Unlike the messenger model, once providers have set forth in
the PPA the terms they are willing to accept, they have agreed
to be bound by the PPO's agreement with the purchaser. Thus,
the PPO can present the prices and providers to purchasers and
let the purchasers determine who should be in the network.
4. Most Favored Nation Clauses
Some PPOs include a most favored nations clause22 in their
pricing terms. A most favored nations clause guarantees the
22. For a detailed examination of most favored nation clauses, see Anthony J.
Dennis, Potential Anticompetitive Effects of Most Favored Nations Clauses in Managed
Care and Health Insurance Contracts, 4 ANNALS HEALTH L. 71 (1995).
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PPO the best pricing offered by the provider. If the provider
enters into a contract with another PPO or another payer in
which the provider grants a greater discount or accepts a lower
price than is the case with the PPO that negotiated the most
favored nations clause (the "protected" provider), the provider
is obligated to extend that price to the protected PPO. Such
clauses have been especially popular in PPOs sponsored by vari-
ous Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans.
From the standpoint of the PPO, the justification for requiring
a most favored nations clause is simple enough: the PPO is guar-
anteed to receive the best price and to remain competitive with
other PPOs and managed care plans operating in the market.
Arguably, the clause is procompetitive by ensuring the best pos-
sible pricing for the PPO. The most favored nations clause does
not prohibit any price discounts to other payers, but rather sim-
ply requires that the protected PPO receive the full benefit of
such discounts.
There is, however, an argument that most favored nations
clauses can be anticompetitive. It is not uncommon for a pro-
vider to agree to a smaller discount for a PPO that has a large
patient base than might be offered to a start-up PPO. The start-
up PPO may offer incremental patient volume to the provider,
justifying a greater discount. In contrast, the same discount pro-
vided to a PPO that already represents a large part of the pa-
tient base for the provider could be financially devastating for
the provider. In particular, a provider might be especially in-
clined to grant a larger discount to a new PPO that the provider
is involved in starting. If one of the dominant PPOs negotiated
a most favored nations clause, the provider will not be able to
grant a bigger discount to the smaller PPO that offers incremen-
tal patient volume. Thus, the most favored nations clause may
operate to discourage both price competition and start-up PPOs.
Thus, the clause can result in the dominant PPO's further en-
trenchment into the market niche.
The foregoing argument has been made in the context of a
few antitrust cases. While generally the argument has not been
accepted, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
issued a letter on September 7, 1993, recommending that the
Pennsylvania Insurance Department disapprove a most favored
nations clause in a Blue Cross/Blue Shield agreement.23
23. Letter from Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Divi-
sion, United States Department of Justice to Cynthia M. Maleski, Commissioner,
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In many cases, providers attempting to resist a most favored
nations clause can use the Antitrust Department's recommenda-
tion in negotiations with the payer. While it will be hard to
bring a successful court challenge to a most favored nations
clause, the Antitrust Division's argument may be enough to dis-
courage a PPO or payer from insisting on the inclusion of the
clause.
Antitrust issues aside, a most favored nations clause will gen-
erally not be in the best interest of providers in the network. A
provider who agrees to such a clause effectively grants a large
discount any time the provider agrees with one PPO to terms
that are more favorable than the terms already offered to the
protected PPO. Thus, providers must keep the clause in mind
when negotiating rates with all other PPOs.
In some cases, it may be difficult to calculate how discounts
offered to one PPO can be translated to another PPO. This is
true, for example, where one PPO's prices are calculated on the
basis of a fixed percentage discount from usual and customary
charges, another PPO utilizes its proprietary fee schedule, an-
other PPO utilizes Medicare DRGs or RBRVS with its own con-
version factor, and still another PPO negotiates a global or
capitated price for certain services. There is no easy way to
translate such divergent discounts into the pricing required
under the most favored nations clause.
Similarly, it is difficult for a PPO to enforce such a clause.
Short of auditing the provider's PPAs, there few ways to know
the precise pricing terms the provider offered to other PPOs.
An audit of other pricing arrangements poses anticompetitive
problems, as the audit process would give the auditing PPO ac-
cess to commercially sensitive information regarding the opera-
tions of its competitors. In addition, many PPOs require that
providers keep the terms of their PPAs confidential. Thus, there
can be substantial tension between the operation of a most fa-
vored nations clause and the clauses of other contracts of other
PPOs.
In sum, the most favored nations clause creates a number of
opportunities for conflict and disagreement. From the pro-
vider's standpoint, it rarely is desirable to agree to a most. fa-
vored nations clause. From the PPO's standpoint, it can be very
difficult to enforce the most favored nations clause in a rapidly
Pennsylvania Department of Insurance (Sept. 7, 1993) (on file with author); see Den-
nis, supra note 22, at 73-74, 81.
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changing market. In addition, it may be difficult for a PPO to
recruit providers with a most favored nations requirement. As a
result, most favored nations clauses are rarely used in PPAs.
5. Insurance and Hold-Harmless Clauses
Two other important terms in the PPA relate to the provider's
insurance obligations. The PPA generally sets forth the mini-
mum level of insurance that the provider is required to main-
tain. In some cases, the insurance provisions are very minimal: a
physician merely has to maintain whatever level of insurance
may be required to maintain medical staff privileges. More re-
cently, PPOs have specified minimum levels of insurance, such
as $1,000,000 per claim, $3,000,000 annual aggregate. Indeed,
many employers and other potential purchasers of access to net-
works insist that PPO networks guarantee that all network prov-
iders maintain such minimum levels of insurance.
In addition, many payer contracts and/or PPAs include hold-
harmless and indemnification clauses. These clauses require
providers to hold the PPO and/or payer harmless from any
claims that may result from any actions of the provider and to
indemnify the PPO and/or provider for expenses incurred in
such actions. On the surface, it is reasonable for the PPO and
the payer to request such protection. Unfortunately, the provi-
sions of many providers' professional liability insurance policies
specifically exclude coverage for hold-harmless/indemnification
obligations, as these are viewed as contractual undertakings and
not liability under tort theories covered by the policies. An
agreement to undertake an indemnification/hold-harmless obli-
gation may effectively undermine the provider's professional lia-
bility coverage.
Of course, it is not in the interest of either the PPO or payers
to undermine a provider's liability coverage by requiring a hold-
harmless/indemnification clause. The clause is only as good as
the assets behind the person agreeing to it. In most cases, the
PPO and payer would be better served by having access to in-
surance coverage rather than an indemnification/hold-harmless
clause. The dilemma can be solved by omitting the indemnifica-
tion/hold-harmless requirement entirely and naming the PPO
and the payer as additional insureds on the provider's insurance
policy. In other cases, the provider gives assurances that ade-
quate insurance coverage will be maintained and the PPO and
(Vol. 4
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the payer will be indemnified only to the extent that insurance is
not available.
6. Covenants Not to Compete and Exclusivity
Some PPOs also attempt to restrict the ability of participants
in the network to affiliate with other networks or otherwise
compete with the sponsoring PPO. At least at this point, such
clauses are fairly rare. Most PPOs are nonexclusive in that they
do not limit the ability of providers to participate in other PPOs.
PPOs that include such restrictions generally justify them on
the basis of trying to ensure provider loyalty to the network.
The view is that providers should focus all of their efforts on a
single network in order to make that network a success. If prov-
iders are involved in a number of networks, they may devote
less energy and have less of a commitment to assure that any
particular network is successful.
The restriction is particularly useful in the case of a PPO net-
work that is established by a group of providers. Such networks
generally require a significant commitment on the part of the
providers to ensure the success of the network. The network
may also want to ensure that individual providers who learn
how to form and operate a PPO through their participation in
the network do not appropriate that expertise and form a rival
network.
From the perspective of providers, limitations on the net-
works in which they can participate are not desirable. Most
providers participate in a wide variety of networks. It is hard to
know which networks will be the most successful. At least in the
near term, it will probably continue to be in the best interest of
many providers to be a part of many networks.
When reviewing each PPA, providers should look for
noncompete or exclusivity clauses. Generally, the first reaction
when encountering such clauses should be to try to eliminate the
clause entirely. If that is not possible, the next step is to con-
sider the extent of the burden imposed by the clause and to de-
termine if a less restrictive alternative exists.
While providers should avoid clauses that restrict their ability
to participate in any other PPO network, a clause that merely
restricts a provider's ability to participate in another provider-
controlled network may not be that onerous. Such a clause
would still permit participation in networks that may be formed
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by payers or other independent entities and would provide rea-
sonable protection to the provider-sponsored PPO.
7. Term and Termination Provisions
Another important issue associated with PPAs is the length of
the term and process for termination. PPAs generally have rea-
sonably extensive term and termination provisions.
The first issue is the initial term of the PPA. The most com-
mon initial term is one year. Some PPAs, however, do have
somewhat longer base terms. From the provider's perspective,
the length of the term determines the period during which the
provider will be locked into the pricing provisions. If either the
discount or the fee schedule becomes inadequate to generate
the revenue requirements of the provider, the provider must
wait until the end of the term to adjust the pricing. On the other
hand, if the provider fears increasing discounts in the future, a
long term holds off the day of reckoning when the PPO will ask
for greater discounts or lower fees.
Another important aspect of some PPAs is the "evergreen
clause." An evergreen clause provides that the agreement will
automatically be renewed for subsequent renewal terms unless
either party gives notice of nonrenewal within a specified time
prior to the end of the current term. An evergreen clause pro-
vides a degree of permanence to the arrangement without the
need to renegotiate the contract. However, a disadvantage that
it may pose is the inability to adjust fees to reflect changed cir-
cumstances. Sometimes fee adjustments are accomplished
through a built-in fee escalator tied to some measure of infla-
tion. In other cases, the parties agree to substitute a new fee
schedule at the time of the automatic renewal.
The PPA generally provides a number of grounds for its ter-
mination prior to the end of its regular term. For example, gen-
erally a PPA will automatically terminate if the provider loses a
required license or privileges to perform medical services. It
may also permit termination on the basis of professional review
activity that is a part of the PPO's functions. More and more
PPOs are conducting ongoing professional review activities to
weed out providers who are either of marginal quality or per-
ceived to be overutilizers of medical services and resources. The
PPO has the option of either waiting until the end of the term to
eliminate such providers or to terminate them during the term.
More aggressive PPOs are including clauses that allow immedi-
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ate termination as a result of peer review activities of the PPO.
As a protection to the providers, the PPO generally agrees to
provide a measure of due process before terminating any pro-
vider prior the end of the current term.
In circumstances where due process is provided, the rationale
for doing so is twofold. First, due process is viewed as a method
of ensuring fairness to terminated providers. Second, due pro-
cess conducted in accordance with the guidelines of the Health
Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA) 24 may provide im-
munity from liability for peer review activity under the Act. In
most cases, full compliance with HCQIA requires that the
credentialing body report to the National Practitioner Data
Bank any restriction of privileges that is related to quality con-
cerns. Thus, a PPO may have to distinguish between termina-
tion for quality reasons and termination for economic reasons:
termination for quality reasons would be a reportable event
while termination for economic reasons would not.25
The extent to which HCQIA applies to PPO credentialing ac-
tivities is also uncertain. The Act applies to the "professional
review action" of a "professional review body, '26 which is de-
fined as a "health care entity" and its governing board and com-
mittees.27 In turn, a "health care entity" is defined to include an
"entity (including a health maintenance organization or a group
medical practice) that provides health care services and that fol-
lows a formal peer review process for the purpose of furthering
quality health care. ' 28 Thus, a good argument can be made that
the credentialing activity of a PPO is subject to HCQIA. Even
if it were ultimately found that HCQIA does not apply to PPO
activities, a good faith attempt to follow HCQIA requirements
is the best defense against liability for credentialing decisions.29
24. The HCQIA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (1994), requires that professional re-
view activities be taken: (1) "In the reasonable belief that the action [is] in the fur-
therance of quality health care," (2) "After a reasonable effort to obtain the facts,"
(3) "After adequate notice and hearing procedures," and (4) "In the reasonable belief
that the action [is] warranted by the facts." 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a) (1994).
25. For a general discussion of the HCQIA, see Kathleen L. Blaner, Physician,
Heal Thyself: Because the Cure, the Health Care Quality Improvement Act, May Be
Worse Than the Disease, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 1073 (1988); Christopher S. Morter,
Note, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Will Physicians Find Peer
Review More Inviting?, 74 VA. L. REV. 1115 (1988).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
27. Id. § 11151(11) (1988).
28. Id. § 11151(4)(A)(ii) (1988).
29. See Blaner, supra note 25, at 1091, and Morter, supra note 25, at 1122 (both
discussing immunity under HCQIA).
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Of course, the PPA will typically provide for termination for
cause, such as a material breach by one party that is not cured
within a specified period. These clauses may be fairly specific
regarding the definition of a material breach. From the pro-
vider's perspective, it is important to specify in this term the
ability to terminate the agreement on relatively short notice if
the PPO or the payers are not paying the provider for services in
a timely manner. Particularly in the case of contracts to provide
services to an HMO, providers generally continue to be obli-
gated to provide service to enrollees until the contract is termi-
nated even if the HMO is not making payments. Thus, the
provider should be able to terminate the contract shortly after
nonpayment.
8. Effect of Termination
Just as PPAs are *unique in their nature, so is their termina-
tion. It is useful to appreciate that the PPO most often stands as
a broker between the payers and the providers. On the payer/
PPO side, the PPO typically has promised the payer that the
payer would have access to the network throughout the term of
the payer/PPO contract. On the PPO/provider side, the PPA ef-
fectively obligates the PPO to include the provider, and the pro-
vider agrees to be included, in any payer/PPO arrangements
negotiated during the term of the PPA. To complicate matters,
the terms of the various payer/PPO contracts frequently run off
cycle from the terms of the PPAs.
To use a simple example, assume that a PPA runs from July 1
of one year through June 30 of the following year. During that
one-year term, the PPO is including the provider in all network
arrangements that meet the terms specified in the PPA. Most of
those network arrangements with payers will have terms other
than July 1 to June 30. For example, the PPO may enter into an
arrangement with an employer that is effective on June 1 of the
second year and runs through May 31 of the third year. All of
the providers who signed PPAs effective July 1 of the first year
will be included in the network offered to the employer effective
June 1 of the second year. If some providers wish to terminate
their arrangement with the PPO effective July 1 of the second
year, the PPO still needs to ensure the employer that contracted
for the network on June 1 of that year that all of the providers
will be available to the employer throughout that year.
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There are two ways to address the off-cycle dilemma. In some
cases, the PPO can negotiate all of the contracts (both the
payer/PPO contracts and the provider/PPO contracts) on the
same cycle, such as a calendar-year basis. If a payer, such as an
employer, wishes to retain the network midyear, it would only
be able to contract with the network for a part of the year. The
next year, the employer could enter into a year-long agreement.
Similarly, all of the PPAs would be established on a calendar-
year basis. If a provider expressed an interest in joining the net-
work in the middle of the year, the provider would only be of-
fered a partial-year contract.
Of course, it can be hard to force all of the payers and provid-
ers into a calendar-year or fiscal-year structure. Payers that
have a benefit year that runs counter to the calendar or fiscal
year selected by the PPO would not be able to agree to the an-
nual cycle offered by the PPO. Thus, it is more common for
PPOs to try to contract with providers on the basis of a calendar
or fiscal year, but to make it clear that the PPA will bind provid-
ers for all contracts entered into by the PPO during the term of
the PPA. If the terms of specific payer arrangements run be-
yond the term of the PPA (and most likely they will), the pro-
vider agrees to continue providing services to the specific payers
through the end of the specific payers' terms. Thus, there will
be a "tail" of provider obligations that continue after the termi-
nation of the PPA. The termination of the PPA stops the PPO
from including the provider in any new arrangements or in the
renewal of any existing arrangements. The provider remains re-
sponsible, however, for continuing to provide services to payers
during the balance of the term of all existing payer/PPO ar-
rangements that may exist on the PPA's termination date.
9. Incorporation by Reference
Many PPAs will incorporate a number of documents by refer-
ence. In some cases, these documents are not offered to the
provider, forcing the provider to ask for them. The language of
the incorporation provision attempts to bind the provider re-
gardless of whether the incorporated documents have been
given to the provider.
Incorporated documents may include the PPO's rules and
regulations, credentialing standards, due process procedures, or
specific payer requirements. While the provider may be given a
summary of the terms required, if the terms of the full docu-
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ments are incorporated by reference, the provider is bound by
the full terms.
There is nothing illegal or necessarily inappropriate about in-
corporating other documents by reference. The only alert for
providers is to ensure that they have been given any documents
or terms that are incorporated by reference, and that they un-
derstand and agree to those terms.
10. Continuation of Care Requirements
Many PPAs include terms that require providers to continue
providing care to enrollees associated with specific payers dur-
ing the term of the PPA even if the providers are not being paid
by the involved payer. For the most part, these provisions are
directed at involvement in an HMO network. Most state laws
mandate HMOs to require all providers to continue to provide
care without regard to payment. Some states deem the require-
ment a term of the PPA even if the clause is not specifically
included in the PPA, protecting patients by ensuring that all of
the care required by enrollees is provided for a single capitation
fee.30 The requirement generally applies until the provider can
validly terminate the PPA.
If the PPO wants to make its network available to an HMO,
the need to include the continuation of care language for the
HMO will generally prohibit the providers from negotiating out
of such a clause if they desire to join the PPO. The best way for
providers to protect themselves from an insolvent payer is to
carefully monitor the financial status of payers before entering
into a contract. In addition, the PPA should allow the provider
to terminate the payer within a short period of time if the payer
falls behind in payments. With that level of financial protection,
the continuation of care requirement may not be onerous for
providers.
11. Contract Reopeners
Regardless of the length of the PPA's term, there may be cir-
cumstances that make it desirable to change the contract prior
to its expiration. A contract reopener provision is intended to
permit the parties to renegotiate certain aspects of the PPA in
the event of certain contingencies set forth in the provision.
Contingencies may include the passage of health reform meas-
30. See, e.g., 215 ILCS 125/2-8 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
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ures, the changes in need or addition of a large payer, changes in
governmental regulations, or other circumstances.
Of course, even in the absence of a reopener, all of the parties
could voluntarily agree to reopen the contract. However, there
would be nothing to force the parties to renegotiate if one of the
parties declined the request to reopen. Thus, the reopener pro-
vision is useful in protecting the PPO from recalcitrant providers
who may refuse to renegotiate in the absence of the term.
Contract reopeners do not force parties to agree to any terms
that may be proposed by the other party. Instead, if one party
exercises its right to reopen the contract, the other party is obli-
gated to negotiate the proposed change in good faith. If the ne-
gotiations do not resolve the issue, then generally either party
may terminate the contract on relatively short notice. In most
cases, a well-crafted reopener term provides useful flexibility for
all parties to the PPA.
CONCLUSION
Many observers believe that, for many reasons, PPOs are
somewhat transitory creatures in our health care delivery sys-
tem. First, PPOs potentially face greater antitrust risks than do
integrated group practices contracting directly with payers. Sec-
ond, PPOs cannot bear risk (for example, offer capitation pay-
ments) as well as integrated group practices and HMOs. Third,
the looser structure of PPOs may not be as effective in monitor-
ing and controlling utilization and quality. Thus, HMOs are
likely to supplant many PPOs as health care reform measures
attempt to curtail costs and increase the efficient delivery of
care.
However, it is also possible that PPOs will evolve into entities
that bear more risk. Some PPOs may accept capitation or other
payment arrangements that are close to HMO arrangements. In
some cases, PPOs may serve as a vehicle by which providers be-
gin the process of integrating their practices. In any event,
PPOs are a necessary transitional structure as our health care
delivery system evolves away from the unrestricted fee-for-ser-
vice system to one of managed care.
Those forming PPOs must realize that there is no silver bullet
that guarantees success in our increasingly competitive and rap-
idly evolving health care system. There is no magic structure
that guarantees that the participants in a PPO will become and
remain competitive. The success of a PPO depends far more on
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the hard work of providers monitoring the care that they pro-
vide and changing their practice patterns to become more cost
effective than it depends on the precise organizational form or
contracts of the PPO. Of course, it is important for a PPO to
develop provider agreements and credentialing and utilization
review structures that grant proper incentives to providers to
improve efficiency and reduce costs. But the ultimate success of
any PPO (or any managed care structure) will depend on
thousands of individual decisions of providers committed to im-
proving the way health care services are delivered.
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